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The evolving nature of atypical work arrangements is studied. A particular focus is placed on 
one such form of work relation: zero hour contracts (ZHCs). The paper uses existing secondary 
data and new survey data collected for the specific purpose of studying alternative work 
arrangements to describe the nature of ZHC work in the UK labour market. The interaction 
with labour market policy is explored, in the context of the 2016 introduction of the UK’s 
National Living Wage. ZHC work is shown to be an important feature of today’s work 
arrangements, and the wage cost shock induced by the new, higher minimum wage resulted in 
an increased use of ZHCs in the UK social care sector, and in low wage sectors more generally. 
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 Contemporary labour markets feature the use of “atypical” work arrangements. Some 
of these – like self-employment and agency work – have emerged in their current format as an 
evolution of previous work structures. Others – like short hours and zero hours contracts1 – 
reflect more the work demands of the modern age, with their introduction driven by technical 
and social change. The increased incidence of this kind of work has led to discussions of there 
being a trade-off between additional flexibility and the emergence of low wage, dead end jobs, 
which function outside the job legislation offered in conventional forms of employment. 
 From a research perspective, it is important to try to determine which side of this trade-
off dominates, and if it differs by work arrangement. In this paper, we consider the case of the 
UK labour market where the rise of atypical work has been a key feature of the post-financial 
crisis period. The focus is placed specifically on one kind of alternative work arrangement that 
has increasingly entered the UK setting, namely zero hours contracts (ZHCs). Almost a million 
people are on ZHCs at the time of writing, out of a total workforce of 32 million. Many of these 
ZHC work positions are prominent in the low-wage sectors of employment. Their relevance to 
labour market policy that affects low wage levels is therefore high. 
 The principal focus of the paper is placed upon developing a better understanding of 
ZHCs and labour market policy. More specifically, in doing this, the paper has two main aims. 
The first is to empirically document the evolution and characterisation of ZHCs in the UK 
setting. There are two parts to this, the first drawing on data from the Quarterly Labour Force 
Survey and the second on newly collected survey data on alternative work arrangements. Part 
of the latter survey is devoted to ZHCs, which are only limitedly surveyed and understood in 
                                                 
1 Workers on zero hours contracts agree to be available for work as and when required, with no guaranteed hours 




existing survey data sources (Abraham and Amaya, 2018) and – consequently – in the 
literature, and the intention is to fill this gap with new evidence. 
 The second aim is to explore the extent to which labour market institutions have the 
scope to be, at least partly, responsible for the increased diffusion of flexible work 
arrangements, or – conversely – whether the latter are a consequence of factors that have little 
to do with labour market institutions and rigidities. In this paper, a particular policy focus is 
placed on minimum wages, where we are interested in understanding whether higher minimum 
wages have potential to induce a larger utilisation of alternative work arrangements by firms 
and, consequently, a shift in the composition of their workforce towards more flexible, but also 
insecure jobs.  
In Europe, the rise of alternative work arrangements and gig-economy jobs is often 
considered an expression of the duality of the labour market, whereby the existence of rigidities 
in the “primary” market creates the conditions for an expansion of more flexible contractual 
relationships in the “secondary” market. Alternative work arrangements have also grown in the 
US, where labour markets are overall less rigid than in Europe, but minimum wages are an 
important component of labour market policies. By providing direct evidence on the role – or 
lack thereof – of minimum wage policies on the incidence of flexible work arrangements, this 
paper contributes to understanding a policy question relevant to both the US and European 
labour markets.  
In the first part of the paper, survey-based evidence is presented to show that ZHCs are 
a key contract type in some, predominantly low wage, sectors of the UK labour market. They 
are characterised by the flexibility/dead end jobs trade-off already introduced above. They also 
feature, in different guises or by different names, in other countries’ employment structures. 
The second part of the paper analyses minimum wage policy and ZHC utilisation by exploiting 




in the UK in April 2016, when a new minimum wage rate – the National Living Wage (NLW) 
– was introduced (Bell and Machin, 2017; Giupponi and Machin, 2018). In the UK setting, 
ZHC usage by employers does seem to have been affected by changes in labour market policy, 
as the sizable hike of the minimum wage that occurred when the NLW was introduced did shift 
more workers onto ZHC positions in the adult social care sector (and in low wage sectors more 
generally). To our knowledge, this is the first study connecting minimum wage changes to 
employer use of different types of job contracts. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, a description of the atypical 
work arrangement under study, ZHCs, is given, together with a discussion of the extent to 
which other countries have similar job contracts. In Section 3, the relevant literature to the 
subject matter of the paper is discussed. Section 4 reports the analysis that documents the 
patterns of ZHC coverage in the UK labour market. Section 5 describes the evidence on 
minimum wages and ZHC jobs. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Atypical Work Arrangements: Zero Hours Contracts 
2.1 Zero Hours Contracts in the UK 
ZHCs are an employment contract under which a worker is not guaranteed any hours 
and is only paid for work carried out. It can be viewed as a form of on-call working, as workers 
can be offered hours at short notice, as and when an employer needs them. Workers are not 
obliged to accept work that has been offered to them2 and, similarly, employers are not obliged 
to offer any work. Thus, ZHCs offer flexibility to both the employer and the employee, and, as 
a result, some workers may prefer them to typical fixed hour employment contracts. 
Conversely, due to the lack of security and guaranteed income, they are unlikely to be suitable 
                                                 




for many workers. Such contracts have become prevalent in particular industries such as retail, 
health, and hospitality. 
ZHCs have, in theory, always been possible to be used by employers in the UK and 
have no specific legal status, rather being an informal term to refer to a type of contract. Their 
use has seen an increase over the past decade. Estimates from the Office of National Statistics 
(ONS) suggest that in 2008 143,000 employees were on ZHCs whereas by 2017 this figure was 
883,000. Until 1998, ZHCs were often used to “clock off” workers during quiet periods 
nonetheless expecting them to stay on site, though this exploitative practice was ended in 1998 
with the passing of the Working Time Regulations. 
Table 1 presents a breakdown of various legislation coverage for different forms of 
employment relation in the UK setting. While ZHC workers are covered by some employment 
legislation, such as minimum wage coverage and holiday pay, legal complications have arisen 
due to the nature of the contract. One key area of contention has been whether a worker is also 
considered an “employee”, which would in turn grant them additional rights, such as unfair 
dismissal protection (Adams et al., 2018).3 While the contract itself would not classify workers 
as employees, case law in the UK to date has concentrated more on whether there is a pattern 
of regular work being accepted, and if so the employee classification would be granted (Pyper 
and Powell, 2018).  
ZHCs have received a fair amount of attention both in the UK media and from the UK 
Parliament. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government that was in power from 
2010 to 2015 launched a review of the use of ZHCs in 2013. This raised four main areas of 
concern – exclusivity clauses, transparency of contracts offered to workers, uncertainty of 
earnings and an imbalance in the employment relationship. Up to now, the only area which has 
                                                 
3 Workers are still afforded a number of core employment rights, unlike for example, those gig economy workers 




been legislatively addressed is that concerning exclusivity clauses, i.e. clauses that prevented 
workers on ZHCs from working for more than one employer. As of March 2015, the Small 
Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 came into force and effectively banned 
exclusivity clauses on ZHCs.  
2.2 Zero Hours-Like Contracts: the International Setting 
As stated above there is no legal definition in the UK for ZHCs, and thus international 
comparisons rely on assessing qualitative similarities. This can often be problematic due to the 
differences in terminology, legal status and governance. Similar atypical working arrangements 
however do exist and there is varied diffusion across Europe and other developed economies, 
though they often operate under different names, and levels of regulation. Caution should 
nonetheless be taken when drawing parallels as the welfare implications of such arrangements 
will also rely on factors such as union coverage and domestic economic performance. 
Probably the largest proportion of such atypical contracts exists in Australia, where 
“casual employment” contracts are a legal classification and approximately 25% of employees 
are on such contracts. Around half of workers on these contracts receive variable earnings from 
one period to the next, and around a third would like more hours (Gilfillan, 2018). Australia is 
however an outlier in this case, since most developed economies where zero hours-like 
contracts are used generally have usage rates in the same region as the UK. In Canada 3.2% of 
employment is “casual employment” and in the US approximately 2.6% is “on-call”. In 
Europe, Finland reported 4% of employees on ZHCs, Norway 0.8%, in Netherlands 6.4% are 
“on-call”, and the Irish Quarterly National Household Survey reports that approximately 5.3% 
of Irish employees have constant variation in their working hours.4 Given the varied definition 
and sometimes lack of a legal classification, equivalent statistics do not necessarily exist for all 
countries where there is diffusion.  
                                                 




The attention these types of contracts have received in the media and parliament are not 
unique to the UK. Following union pressure, New Zealand passed regulation in 2016 which 
stipulated that firms needed to outline a minimum number of guaranteed hours each week and 
employee refusal of hours beyond that should not result in any detriment to the worker. 
Furthermore, it introduced the requirement of compensation to the worker if shifts were 
cancelled at short notice. In Finland, a Citizen’s Initiative gathered 50,000 supporters to ban 
ZHCs, and though it was rejected by parliament, a number of proposals have been made in 
order to regulate such employment relationships. The most recent looks to ensure that 
employers present a valid reason (relating to demand fluctuations) as to why they require to 
use a ZHC. Extensive regulation was introduced in 2012 and 2013 to “on-call” work in Italy 
and has severely restricted the use of zero hours-like contracts to only older and younger age 
groups, and in 2014 further regulation was introduced in both the Netherlands and France. 
Table 2 presents a comparative set of descriptions and associated regulations for zero 
hours-like contracts in Western Europe (where they are present) and for the US. Western 
Europe generally experiences significant regulation of zero hours-like contracts. For example, 
while proliferation in the EU is largest in the Netherlands, workers there enjoy regulations that 
ensure a minimum number of hours of work whenever they are called to work, as well as agreed 
hour adjustments based on the previous 3 months of work. Conversely, unlike the UK, 
employees must work when called upon. Such idiosyncrasies exemplify how outwardly similar 
contractual agreements may have very different implications when in action. What is evident, 
however, is that the UK, Sweden and the US (aside from some specific cities) appear to have 
the least regulation of zero hours-like contracts. Union density in Sweden is high (around 70%), 
but in both the UK and the US rates are much lower (23.2% and 10.7% respectively). Thus, 
proliferation of zero hours (-like) contracts in the UK and the US, where workers’ real wage 




3. Related Literature 
3.1 Atypical Work Arrangements 
 Employment relationships such as ZHCs, diverging from the standard full-time, 
permanent, regular and single employer set-up have been characterised as “atypical” 
(Eurofound, 2017) and such working arrangements have seen a large amount of growth in the 
past two decades in a number of developed economies (Eichhorst and Tobsch, 2013; Gielen 
and Schils, 2014; Katz and Krueger, 2016; LSE Growth Commission, 2017). The concept of 
“atypical” work arrangements has always been somewhat nebulous, but spans a variety of 
working practices including part-time, agency, contract, short fixed term, contingent and 
independent contracting. Studies have demonstrated the large heterogeneity across these types 
of employment relationships, though part time and temporary work fare relatively badly in 
terms of wages when compared to their standard counterpart (Kalleberg, 2000).  
ZHCs most closely match the definition for contingent work,5 and early literature 
suggested that atypical working arrangements, especially in the form of temporary or 
contingent work, offered workers lower wages, fewer benefits, less security and little scope for 
human capital development (Rodgers and Rodgers, 1989; Beard and Edwards, 1995; Nollen, 
1996; Kalleberg, 2000). Conversely, however, more recent (albeit weak) evidence has 
suggested that atypical work may serve as a stepping stone to more stable employment in the 
long run, when faced between an option of continued job search and atypical employment 
(Addison and Surfield, 2009). 
 The past few years have seen a growth in the interest in atypical or “alternative” work 
arrangements with a small portion of the literature presenting descriptive evidence as well as 
trying to understand the mechanisms driving the shift to such types of work. Factors that have 
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been suggested to be contributors include weak demand conditions, worker’s preferences and 
technological change; where the latter of these may work by reducing transaction costs. Since 
transaction costs – such as search, monitoring and enforcement costs – are, according to Coase 
(1937), factors that lead to the creation of the firm, it is likely that technological change would 
lead to a blurring of the boundaries of the firm. 
Katz and Krueger (2019) found that, over the ten year period between 2005 and 2015, 
the proportion of workers engaged in some form of alternative work arrangement grew by 10-
20% in the United States, while analysis of the UK labour market has shown a growth in both 
the prevalence of ZHCs as well as individuals described as “self-employed with no employees” 
(LSE Growth Commission, 2017).  
Katz and Krueger (2017) report US findings that individuals who suffer periods of 
unemployment are 7-17% more likely to be employed in alternative work arrangements 1 to 
2.5 years later than their observational counterparts who did not experience such 
unemployment. These results suggest that at least one factor that could be driving the supply 
side of the atypical labour market is a weakening of market power for workers. Additionally, 
Mas and Pallais (2017) use a discrete choice experiment to elicit willingness to pay for 
alternative work arrangements for call centre workers and find that the average worker is 
willing to give up a fifth of their wages to avoid an employer dictated work schedule. This 
gives further evidence that low paid workers finding themselves in contingent work 
arrangements are likely to be engaged in such work out of necessity rather than choice.  
 To our knowledge there is little recent research concerning the factors driving labour 
demand for contingent work arrangements. There are obvious benefits to employers, in 
particular the ability to reduce wage liabilities and cope with seasonal and weekly fluctuating 
demand conditions. Dube et al. (2018) present evidence demonstrating significant monopsony 




“HIT” work does have some key differences to more traditional sectors, which generally offer 
more on-going work. 
3.2 Minimum Wages 
Over its long existence as a key research area in labour economics, the minimum wage 
literature has evolved along three main lines of research. The primary and most traditional 
focus has been on the employment and unemployment effects of minimum wages, which have 
proven elusive to detect in many cases. Early studies based mostly on US time-series work 
found negative employment effects among teenagers (Brown, Gilroy and Kohen, 1982). 
However, apart from those, the vast majority of quasi-experimental micro-based work that 
started in the early 1990s in the US and the UK (Card and Krueger, 1994; Machin, Manning 
and Rahman, 2003; Stewart, 2004; Giupponi and Machin, 2018), and of more recent analyses 
based on spatial identification in the US find hardly any evidence of disemployment effects of 
minimum wages (Dube, Lester and Reich, 2010 and 2016; Baskaya and Rubinstein, 2015; 
Clemens and Wither, 2014).6  
Partly in response to this fairly widespread inability to find evidence of disemployment 
effects, a second strand of research has investigated other margins through which firms can 
adjust to the wage cost shock induced by the minimum wage increase. Examples of such 
margins of adjustment are prices (Aaronson, 2001; MaCurdy, 2015; Harasztosi and Lindner, 
2017), profits (Draca, Machin and Van Reenen, 2011), firm value (Bell and Machin, 2018) and 
the quality of services provided (Giupponi and Machin, 2018). A third body of the literature 
has looked at the impact on wage inequality at the bottom of the distribution, and at wage 
spillover effects up the wage distribution and onto legally unaffected workers (DiNardo, Fortin 
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and Lemieux, 1996; Lee, 1999; Autor, Manning and Smith, 2016; Giupponi and Machin, 
2018). 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper examining the impact of a minimum 
wage change on contractual arrangements. We thus contribute to the existing literature by 
assessing the impact of minimum wages on workers’ employment conditions (other than pay) 
and on the utilisation of flexible contractual forms by firms that can act as buffers against the 
wage cost shock. We do this by exploiting the introduction of the National Living Wage (NLW) 
in the UK in April 2016. The NLW is the mandated minimum wage rate for workers aged 25 
and over; it was set at £7.20 an hour from April 2016 to March 2017, then uprated to £7.50 in 
April 2017.7 As demonstrated by Figure A1 in Appendix A, while the UK has had various 
national minimum wages (NMW) in place since 1999, the NLW introduction represented a 
substantial (7.5%) increase in the wage floor for those aged 25 and over. 
 
4. Zero Hour Contracts 
4.1 ZHCs in the Labour Force Survey 
 
 The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a quarterly cross-sectional survey of the UK labour 
market. Each quarter contains data on approximately 35,000 employees, some of whom could 
be on a ZHC. Questions relating to flexible work arrangements are asked only in quarters April-
June and October-December therefore in each year it is only these two quarters that are 
analysed. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for both all employees and ZHC employees for 
2017. Of all workers in 2017, around 2.7% are recorded as being on ZHCs. ZHC workers are 
on average more likely to be younger, female, and still in full time education, though still a 
large proportion (over 80%) have completed their full-time education. It is unsurprising that 
                                                 




female workers experience a higher incidence of ZHCs given they are more prevalent amongst 
part time employees. Typically, ZHC workers have lower tenure, though it is unclear whether 
this is due to higher ZHC worker turnover rates or if longer tenured ZHC workers are more 
likely to be placed on more secure contracts. The mean hourly wage for ZHC workers is around 
£5 lower than the equivalent for all workers, and they work on average 10 hours less per week 
than the average employee. Interestingly, the median hourly wage for ZHC workers is very 
close to the 2017 NLW of £7.50 per hour, within approximately 5%. 
Figure 1 and Table 4 exemplify the importance of the NLW for ZHC workers. Figure 
1 shows there to be a very sizable spike in the wage distribution for ZHC workers at the 2017 
NLW of £7.50 an hour. Table 4 shows that, while the NLW is important for a significant 
proportion of all employees, with around 6% paid exactly the NLW and 20% likely to be 
affected by the subsequent minimum wage uprating, the 2016 and 2017 upratings affected a 
lot more – around half – of all ZHC workers. This latter figure could increase when one 
considers the possibility of wage spillover effects up the distribution.8 While the NLW is age 
specific and mandatory only for those aged 25 and over, there is strong evidence that there are 
spillovers for workers aged under 25 (Giupponi and Machin, 2018). Indeed, one can see that 
the proportion paid exactly the NLW is identical for all employees and for those aged 25 and 
over. This identity is lost, but only marginally, when considering ZHC workers.  
The LFS also has a panel version of the survey, albeit with a much smaller sample size. 
We use this to produce transition Tables 5 and 6, which detail flows into/out of ZHC positions 
from/to different types of economic activity. As can be seen by the diagonals in both tables, 
ZHCs have the lowest persistence of all working arrangements presented. Over the period 
analysed (2015-2018) just over a third of ZHC workers remained in ZHC positions after 5 
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quarters and, of ZHC workers, only a quarter were ZHC workers 5 quarters before. ZHC 
workers are most likely to transition from and to other forms of part time employment, full 
time employment and inactivity.  
These patterns of work dynamics act to confirm the somewhat precarious nature of 
ZHCs as a form of employment. One issue that emerges is whether workers who move from 
ZHCs into more secure working arrangements (part time and full time employment) do so by 
changing employer, or if after a period of time their employer offers a more secure contract. 
Equally, there is the question of whether those in “regular” work get reclassified by employers 
onto ZHCs. Sample size issues preclude any systematic and robust probing of this question 
with the data we have available, but when we investigated the interaction between job changes 
and changes in ZHC status for non-job changers, we found there to be a roughly half and half 
mixture of job moves and reclassifications. Clearly both are happening, but this remains 
suggestive as reaching a firmer conclusion would require more detailed and larger sample size 
longitudinal data than we are currently able to study. 
4.2 ZHCs in the LSE-CEP Survey of Alternative Work Arrangements 
 
In order to better understand the role of alternative work arrangements in the UK, 
between February 5th and March 2nd 2018, we ran the “LSE-CEP Survey of Alternative Work 
Arrangements” using an online platform. While the survey was designed to be representative 
of the UK population aged 18-65, its main goal was to collect information on both the types of 
jobs and characteristics of workers involved in alternative work arrangements. The survey 
questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix B. The survey questioned approximately 20,000 
individuals, of which just fewer than 19,000 remained in the cleaned sample.9 
                                                 
9 Respondents were excluded from the cleaned sample if they responded with gibberish to any open questions 




Table A1 in Appendix A presents descriptive statistics for the sample of respondents of 
the LSE-CEP survey. The survey is equally represented across sex and the age distribution, 
with a slightly lower participation rate for the ends (18-24 and 55-65) of the surveyed age 
distribution. Additionally, there is a healthy mixture of qualification attainment as well as 
regional representativeness across the UK. Around half of our sample are employed by a 
private company, a further quarter are employed by either a non-profit or government and the 
remainder are split between some form of self-employment or not working. Sample attrition 
during cleaning does not appear to fundamentally change any of these statistics.  
Table 7 presents descriptive statistics for ZHC workers, for the cleaned sample. ZHCs 
are spread roughly equally across the sexes of respondents, which is marginally different to the 
LFS proportion shown earlier in Table 3. ZHC workers in our survey are on average younger 
than the average worker, though surprisingly share a similar distribution of educational 
qualifications as all workers in the survey. One may have assumed that workers experiencing 
more insecure employment contracts would be those with lower skill sets and thus market 
power, however these summary statistics suggest otherwise. On the whole, a region’s share of 
ZHC workers is roughly the same as their share of workers overall. However, London appears 
to be anomalous in that its share of ZHC workers is about four fifths higher than its share of 
workers. Interestingly, a large proportion of ZHC workers (42% in the cleaned sample) hold 
multiple jobs, and around a third hold a job with a more secure contract. This is suggestive that 
ZHC jobs may act as a form of “top up” income for some workers, and additionally some ZHC 
workers may hold multiple ZHC jobs as a form of insurance due to the possibility of lack of 
hours. 
Hourly wages for ZHC workers in our survey are paid an average of £11.63 per hour; 
this is slightly higher than the same figure produced by the LFS for ZHC workers (£9.77). 




that the modal hourly rate is £8 and that there is a large proportion of individuals paid around 
the region of the NLW rate of £7.50. Thus, it is likely to be the thicker right tail that is driving 
up the mean wage in the CEP survey compared to the LFS, rather than the entire distribution 
being centred higher. 
The average number of hours worked is low (around 19 per week) and similar to the 
figure found in the LFS. This further concretes the fact that many ZHC workers are working 
less than full time. Figure 3 presents the weekly hours distribution. There is a large spread of 
the hours performed, with almost 10% of workers not doing any hours the previous week, 
which may well be reflective of the insecurity related to some ZHC jobs. There does appear to 
be a selection of workers performing full time (or above full time) hours, whether these hours 
are regular is however unclear. 
What is striking is that around one third of ZHC workers do unpaid work each week, 
averaging at 7 hours per week. This would imply the average worker is losing out on 
approximately £80 per week. Such losses may be particularly important for social care workers 
(who we study in more detail below). As discussed in Rubery et al. (2014) domiciliary carers 
for example only get paid for face to face time, and time spent driving between clients may 
result in what they call a ‘fragmented time contract’. Almost two thirds of ZHC workers have 
been working for over five years. Conversely, over half of those sampled have less than one 
year experience on a ZHC, suggesting that an abundance of those on ZHCs have previously 
held non-ZHC working arrangements. 
There are a few industries which stand out as having a large share of workers on ZHCs. 
In particular, retail, education, accommodation and food services, and health and social work. 
For retail and accommodation and food services this is unsurprising, as these professions are 
characterised by having a larger proportion of workers on part time contracts and may be 




of ZHC workers (15%). The social care sector, which falls under this heading, has not only a 
large number of low paid staff, but also faces an informal price cap for its output good, as a 
large proportion of those receiving social care are council funded. It is thus a perfect sector to 
analyse to assess whether firms facing growing wage bills due to the NLW are likely to use 
ZHCs to reduce their wage liability. 
4.3 LSE-CEP Survey Representativeness 
Table A2 in Appendix A presents demographic variables (similar to those in Table 7 
and Table A1 in Appendix A) for both all respondents and ZHC workers from the LFS, and 
can be used to check for the representativeness of the CEP survey. In terms of overall 
representativeness, our survey fairs well with respect to age, qualifications and regional 
distribution. Our survey does however under sample those who did not have a job last week. 
Furthermore, the survey’s representativeness of ZHC workers is generally good, however one 
can see that the mean hourly wage is just under £2 per hour higher in our survey. The median 
wages however are more similar (the gap reduces to £0.64), which suggests that the LSE-CEP 
survey has a slightly fatter right-hand tail of the wage distribution as discussed in section 4.2. 
4.4 LSE-CEP Survey Results 
In this subsection, we report a second set of results that emerged from the survey of 
employees on ZHCs, with a focus on workers preferences and employment conditions. 
An important question is whether workers choose to be on ZHCs for the flexibility that 
they offer, or would instead like a job with a minimum number of guaranteed hours but could 
only find employment as ZHC workers. Our survey results suggest an almost even split 
between workers who are satisfied with their number of hours (40 percent) and workers who 
would rather work more hours (44 percent), while a remaining 16 percent would like to work 
fewer hours (Figure 4). Of those wanting to work more hours, when asked about the reason 




followed by another 15 percent who are instead constrained by domestic commitments (Figure 
5). As reported in Figure 6, domestic commitments are also the main reason brought about by 
people who would like to work fewer hours (38 percent), followed by the desire to spend more 
time on leisure and other unpaid activities (26 percent) or other types of work (14 percent), 
impediments due to illness or disability (10 percent) and study commitments (7 percent). In 
addition to the number of hours worked, the pattern of those hours may also be a relevant 
dimension of workers’ satisfaction with their jobs. As with the desired number of hours, there 
appears to be an almost even split between respondents who would like to have a more regular 
pattern of hours (45 percent) and those who are satisfied with their current pattern of hours (43 
percent), with the remaining 12 percent wanting a less regular schedule (Figure 7). 
The survey responses regarding desired hours and work time patterns are suggestive of 
an almost even dichotomy between workers who are happy with the amount of work that they 
do, and workers who would like to work more but are unable to. We further investigate this 
issue by asking ZHC workers what are the reasons for their being on a ZHC (Figure 8). In line 
with our previous findings, the two main reasons that stand out are the inability to find 
employment in a job with a guaranteed number of hours (28 percent) and the flexibility to 
perform other activities (28 percent). Less prominent reasons are – in order of relevance – better 
remuneration than other available jobs (20 percent), complementing pay from other jobs (14 
percent) and earning while studying (7 percent). Overall, 51 percent of respondents state that 
they are either satisfied or very satisfied with their ZHC job, 28 percent are neither satisfied 
nor dissatisfied, and the remaining 21 percent are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied (Figure 9). 
Finally, we are interested in whether ZHC workers receive training and what type of 
training they would find most useful. According to our survey results, 55 percent of ZHC 
workers had received some form of training in the past year. As illustrated in column (1) of 




percent), skills training (54 percent), quality training (30 percent), and professional and legal 
training (22 percent). Training was paid for by employers, contractors, customers or someone 
else in 72 percent of cases, by the respondent in 16 percent of cases and free for the remainder 
12 percent (Table 9). We also asked all ZHC respondents what type of training they would find 
useful for their future job prospects (column (2) of Table 8): skills training stands out as 50 
percent of respondents indicate is as useful, followed by safety training (27 percent) and other 
types of training (all deemed useful by approximately 23 percent of respondents). It therefore 
seems that, when offered, training meets individual requirements. 
 
5. ZHCs and Minimum Wages 
 
5.1 Conceptual Framework 
 As documented in the previous sections, a large fraction of workers on ZHCs are paid 
the minimum wage. An interesting question that is relevant for policy is to assess whether 
labour market policies such as minimum wage upratings are responsible for the increased 
diffusion of ZHCs, or – conversely – the latter are a consequence of factors that have little to 
do with labour market institutions. In the first case we should see that a raise of the minimum 
wage increases the utilisation of ZHCs. In second case, we should see no effect of the minimum 
wage on ZHC usage. The rationale for a causal effect of minimum wage policies on ZHC 
utilisation is that ZHCs can help firms buffer the wage cost shock due to the minimum wage 
increase by allowing them not to commit to a minimum number of hours. At the same time, 
though, the burden of insecurity would be transferred from firms onto risk-averse employees, 
potentially worsening the employment conditions of individual workers.  
In this section, we exploit a large minimum wage increase recently implemented in the 
UK – the National Living Wage introduction – to shed light on the causal effect of minimum 




care sector, which previous research has demonstrated to be highly vulnerable to minimum 
wage increases (Machin, Manning and Rahman, 2003; Machin and Wilson, 2004; Giupponi 
and Machin, 2018) and which can therefore provide a good testing ground for the effects of 
minimum wage policies. 
 Whilst there is a sample selection issue of studying care workers, and associated 
questions of generalisability for the UK workforce more widely, looking at the adult social care 
sector allows us to have good quality data on hourly wages and contractual arrangements 
(which are necessary to answer well the question that we ask). Also, the fact that flexible work 
arrangements are already largely in use in this sector means that – if the NLW has an impact 
on ZHC utilisation – this is a sector in which we can see it. Moreover, the estimates are relevant 
for other low-pay, ZHC-intense sectors, like hospitality and retail, which are those we care 
about the most when studying the economic effects of minimum wage floors. 
5.2 The Introduction of the National Living Wage 
The first UK national minimum wage policy dates back to April 1999, when the 
National Minimum Wage (NMW) was first introduced. At that time, a minimum hourly wage 
of £3.60 for workers aged 22 and over, and a lower rate of £3.00 for workers aged between 18 
and 21 were established. Additional rates have been introduced in subsequent years, so that as 
of October 2015 the NMW rates were as follows: an adult minimum rate of £6.70 for workers 
aged 21 and over, a youth development rate of £5.30 for those aged 18-20, a youth minimum 
of £3.87 for 16-17 year olds and an apprentice rate of £3.30. 
On July 8th 2015, the newly elected Conservative Party government called an 
emergency budget, in which the Chancellor George Osborne announced the introduction of the 
National Living Wage (NLW). This unexpected intervention changed the structure of 
minimum wages by introducing a new minimum wage rate of £7.20 an hour for workers aged 




workers unchanged.10 Five minimum wage rates are now in operation in the UK: the NLW for 
workers aged 25 and over, the NMW for 21-24 year olds, the youth development rate for 18-
20 year olds, the young worker rate for 16 and 17 year old, and the apprentice minimum wage.11 
The NLW introduction was an unexpected and radical policy intervention. Firstly, it 
came from a political party that had traditionally been hostile to minimum wages, especially at 
the time of the NMW introduction in April 1999. Secondly, the NLW introduction generated a 
wage change much larger than recent uprates, namely an increase of 10.8 percent at the time 
of announcement in July 2015 and of 7.5 percent at the time of implementation on April 1st 
2016. Most importantly for our analysis, the unexpected and sizable wage shock generated by 
the NLW introduction provides a unique “experiment” to study the consequences of the 
minimum wage increase and the wage cost shock it induced on employers’ use of ZHCs. 
5.3 The Adult Social Care Sector 
The impact of the NLW introduction on ZHC utilisation is studied in the context of 
workers and firms in the English adult social care sector. Specifically, we will consider adult 
social care providers operating in the residential care home industry and the domiciliary care 
industry. Residential care refers to the provision of accommodation and personal care to adults 
in a communal residential centre, which may or may not provide nursing facilities. Members 
of staff in residential care homes are predominantly care assistants, who provide 24 hour 
supervision, meals and help with personal care needs. Domiciliary care – also referred to as 
home care – is a social care service provided to people who live in their own houses and require 
assistance with personal care routines, household tasks such as cleaning and cooking, or any 
other activities they may need to live independently. Domiciliary care assistants typically work 
                                                 
10 Additionally, the NLW was set to achieve 60% of median earnings by 2020, which – at the time of the 
announcement – were forecasted to be £9.00 by the UK Office for Budget Responsibility. 
11 See Giupponi and Machin (2018) for a comprehensive discussion of minimum wages in the UK and for an 





individually, and are often contracted on flexible working hours or zero hours contracts since 
domiciliary care work tends to be organised into short and fragmented home visits. 
The choice of focussing on the adult social care sector is motivated by various reasons. 
Firstly, the sector is highly vulnerable to minimum wages changes, as it has many low-paid 
workers. Of these, the vast majority are older than 25, making the setting especially suited to 
analysing the NLW introduction. Secondly, the sector is close to what can be considered a 
competitive labour market, as it consists of a large number of relatively small firms providing 
a rather homogeneous service, and it is very labour intensive and not unionised. Thirdly, 
residents’ fees are regulated and paid for by local authorities, making it difficult for firms to 
pass higher costs onto prices. For all these reasons, a minimum wage change is likely to have 
a substantial impact on total costs and on economic outcomes of workers and firms in this 
sector, which therefore provides a useful testing ground for analysing the impact of minimum 
wage policies. In other words, the high vulnerability to minimum wage increases the likelihood 
of finding large effects from wage shocks. Finally, the incidence of ZHCs is high – particularly 
in the domiciliary care industry – making this setting especially suited to studying the impact 
of the NLW on ZHCs. 
5.4 Data Sources 
The main data source that is used to analyse the effect of the NLW introduction on ZHC 
utilisation is the National Minimum Dataset for Social Care (NMDS-SC).12 This is an online 
system administered by Skills for Care and funded by the UK Department of Health that 
collects information on the adult social care workforce in England. Social care providers can 
use NMDS-SC to record and manage information about their workers, such as payroll data, 
training and development, job roles, qualifications and basic demographics. By having an 
account and regularly updating it, providers are given access to a set of tools to visualise and 
                                                 




analyse their data, submit applications for training and development funds, compare their 
employment and pay structure with those of other providers locally, regionally or nationally, 
access publications about the social care sector and other e-learning resources for free, and 
directly share their data and returns with authorities such as the Care Quality Commission and 
the NHS. No fee is charged to use NMDS-SC. However, in order to benefit of certain facilities, 
providers must update their account at least once per year.  
The dataset is a panel of matched employer-employee data. For each provider, we have 
information on the industry and main service provided, service capacity and utilisation, number 
of staff employed, geographic location and system update dates. For workers, we have 
information on demographics (gender, age and nationality), job characteristics (job role, 
contract type and qualifications), contracted weekly hours, hourly pay and update date of the 
hourly pay rate. We have access to the snapshot of the NMDS-SC online system at monthly 
frequency from March 2015 to March 2017, each snapshot including all providers in the system 
at that date. 
A second data source is the Care Quality Commission (CQC) registry.13 The registry 
contains a complete record of all active English care providers regulated by CQC at monthly 
frequency. It provides information on the activity status of providers and therefore allows us to 
identify when homes shut down and when new homes enter into the market.  
5.5 Sample Design 
Around 22,000 providers are registered with NMDS-SC as of March 2016. Of these, 
approximately 10,000 are residential care homes with or without nursing, and 3,800 are 
domiciliary care agencies. We match the sample of residential care homes and domiciliary care 
agencies with the CQC registry of active locations from March 2015 to March 2017, from 
                                                 
13 The CQC is the independent regulator of health and adult social care in England. It is responsible for setting 
standards of care and for monitoring, inspecting and rating adult social care providers, to make sure that they meet 




which we can obtain information on whether a firm is active or closed in a given month. Our 
sample comprises care homes that meet the following three criteria: (i) being active from March 
2015 through to March 2017 according to the CQC registry, (ii) having a record on NMDS-SC 
for all those months and (iii) having updated their NMDS-SC account at least once after March 
2016.14 This selection leaves us with a balanced panel of 4,680 firms that are active in March 
2016 and remain open until March 2017.15 
5.6 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 10 reports descriptive statistics for all firms in the balanced sample, and for care 
homes and domiciliary care agencies separately, as of March 2016. The adult social care sector 
is characterised by relatively low hourly pay (£7.57 per hour on average) and a large fraction 
of workers are aged 25 and over (88 percent on average), which are indicative of a high 
vulnerability to minimum wage increases in general and to the NLW introduction in particular.  
The statistics reported in Table 10 also show that the care home sector is characterised 
by medium-sized establishments employing on average 45 employees. Domiciliary care 
agencies have a larger pool of employees as compared to care homes (66 vs 39 employees on 
average), and a remarkably higher proportion of zero hours contract workers (38 vs 5 percent) 
that translates into lower average weekly hours (16 vs 29 hours). Moreover, the proportion of 
workers on other flexible work arrangements such as temporary, bank or agency contracts, is 
almost twice as large in the domiciliary care sector (14 vs 8 percent). These differences most 
likely stem from the very nature of domiciliary care work, which tends to be organised into 
                                                 
14 In order to avoid introducing sample selection driven by unobservable worker and firm characteristics correlated 
with the timing and frequency of updating, we do not condition our sample on a specific update date and only 
require that a firm update its records once in the twelve months after April 1st 2016. Approximately 90 percent of 
NMDS-SC users update within a year. 
15 In our sample we have a total of 3599 care homes and 1081 domiciliary care agencies. According to the 2017 
report on the care home market of the Competition & Market Authority (2017), there are approximately 9500 care 
homes in England. This implies that our sample represents approximately 38 percent of the market for care homes. 
According to a 2016 report of the United Kingdom Home Care Association (2016), the total number of registered 
locations providing domiciliary care in England was 8,500 in March 2016. This implies that our sample represents 




short and fragmented home visits to customers, so that domiciliary care assistants are often 
contracted on flexible working hours.  
Apart from substantial differences in the types of working arrangements, the two sectors 
have an almost identical gender and age composition and similar wage rates. The main 
occupation in both sectors is care assistant and only a very small share of the workforce holds 
a nursing qualification. All these characteristics confirm that the adult social care sector is a 
pertinent context to the studying of the effects of the NLW introduction on wages and 
contractual arrangements. 
5.7 NMDS-SC Representativeness 
We check the representativeness of the NMDS-SC data using data from the ONS’s 
Labour Force Survey (LFS). Table A3 in Appendix A reports the mean and standard deviation 
for a set of individual-level characteristics for care workers in the LFS. 16 The Table also reports 
the same characteristics for care workers at the firm level in NMDS-SC. Demographic 
variables relating to gender, age and region line up very closely. The hourly wage rate and 
number of weekly hours worked are slightly higher in the LFS data, while the proportion of 
workers on ZHC is slightly lower. The discrepancy in average weekly hours in LFS and 
NMDS-SC is most likely due to the fact that the variable in LFS refers to actual hours worked, 
while in NMDS-SC to contractual hours, which – for ZHC workers – are equal to zero and 
therefore pull down the mean. The larger fraction of workers on ZHCs in NMDS-SC may be 
due to the fact that, in this dataset, we cannot account for multiple job holders, which tend to 
be more frequent in ZHC jobs. All in all, the statistics appear to line up quite satisfactorily, 
mostly showing a consistent pattern across sources. 
 
                                                 
16 We select employees with standard occupation classification (SOC2010) marked as “care workers” in the LFS. 




5.8 Empirical strategy 
This section explores whether the minimum wage increase due to the NLW introduction 
had an impact on the share of workers on zero hours contracts. By tilting the composition of 
the workforce towards contracts without a guaranteed number of hours, employers can easily 
adjust employment at the intensive margin, either on top of or in substitution to adjustments 
along the extensive margin. Consistent with previous work (Giupponi and Machin, 2018), we 
will show that the NLW did not have a significant impact on employment, suggesting that any 
substitution toward contracts with flexible working arrangements is to be interpreted as an 
adjustment at the intensive margin. 
The empirical strategy is based on a difference-in-differences methodology in which 
we exploit between-firm variation in the pre-NLW proportion of workers that would be 
affected by the minimum wage increase, in order to identify the effect of the minimum wage 
hike on ZHC utilisation. The regression specification reads as follows: Δq𝑌𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼1,𝑡 + 𝛽1,𝑡𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑗,𝑀𝑎𝑟2016 + 𝑋𝑗,𝑀𝑎𝑟2016′ 𝛾1,𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗,𝑡 (1) 
where Δq𝑌𝑗,𝑡 is the quarter-on-quarter change in the proportion of workers on a ZHC in firm 𝑗 
between quarter 𝑡 and quarter 𝑡 − 1; 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑗,𝑀𝑎𝑟2016 is the proportion of low-paid workers in 
firm 𝑗 as of March 2016; 𝑋 is a vector of pre-NLW firm-level characteristics measured in March 
2016, including the proportion of female workers, the average age, the proportion working as 
care assistants, the proportion with nursing qualification, the occupancy rate and a set of local 
authority districts fixed effects; 𝜉 is a disturbance term.17, 18 The subscript 𝑡 indicates the quarter 
relative to March 2016, which is normalised to take value 𝑡 = 0. The variable 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑗,𝑀𝑎𝑟2016 is 
constructed as the proportion of workers that in March 2016 were paid below the age-specific 
                                                 
17 Data on the gender and age composition, and on the occupancy rate is missing for some firms. Such missing 
information is controlled for via a set of dummy variables. 
18 There is a total of 325 local authority districts in our sample and of 326 local authority districts in England. 




minimum wage rate that would be in place as of April 2016. In other words, the variable 
provides a measure of the NLW bite at firm level. 
The coefficients 𝛽1,𝑡 for 𝑡 = −4, … , 0 are treatment leads and provide an easy way to 
test whether there is any correlation between ZHC utilisation and the proportion of low-paid 
workers prior to the NLW introduction. In other words, the leads allow to test whether there 
were divergent trends in ZHC utilisation between firms more and less exposed to the minimum 
wage increase before the policy change. This is equivalent to testing for the parallel trends 
assumption in a traditional difference-in-differences setting.  
To document the evolution of the relationship between the low-paid proportion and 
ZHC growth in the post-reform quarters, we measure the outcome variable Δq𝑌𝑗,𝑡 as the long 
difference between March 2016 and, respectively, June 2016, September 2016, December 2016 
and March 2017. This is equivalent to estimating the cumulative effect of the reform over post-
reform quarters, i.e. the sum ∑ 𝛽1𝑡𝑘𝑡=1  for 𝑘 = 1, … ,4.  
The empirical strategy rests on the assumption that firms with the highest potential to 
be affected by the NLW introduction were indeed those that experienced larger wage growth 
in the quarters following the policy change, as a consequence of the NLW introduction. Firstly, 
we provide evidence that this is indeed the case. Secondly, we show that the between-firm 
correlation between the proportion of pre-NLW low-paid workers and wage growth is entirely 
due to the minimum wage change. To this end, we estimate a regression specification similar 
to model (1), using quarter-on-quarter wage growth as outcome variable. The regression 
specification reads as follows: Δq𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼2,𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝑡𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑗,𝑀𝑎𝑟2016 + 𝑋𝑗,𝑀𝑎𝑟2016′ 𝛾2,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑗,𝑡 (2) 
where Δq𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑗,𝑡 is the quarter-on-quarter change in the logarithm of the average hourly wage 
in firm 𝑗 between quarter 𝑡 and quarter 𝑡 − 1; 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑗,𝑀𝑎𝑟2016 is the proportion of low-paid 




term. Analogously to what discussed for model (1), the coefficients 𝛽2,𝑡 for 𝑡 = −4, … , 0  are 
treatment leads that allow to test the exogeneity of the minimum wage increase. For post-NLW 
quarters, we measure hourly wage growth (Δq𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑗,𝑡) between March 2016 and, respectively, 
June 2016, September 2016, December 2016 and March 2017. 
5.9 Main results 
Figure 10 reports the coefficients 𝛽2,𝑡 for 𝑡 = −4, … , 0 and the cumulated sum ∑ 𝛽2𝑡𝑘𝑡=1  
for 𝑘 = 1, … ,4, from estimating model (2) on the balanced panel of firms that are active 
throughout all months between March 2015 and March 2017. The dots indicate the estimated 
coefficients and the capped vertical bars report 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust 
standard errors. The specification allows for heterogeneity in the 𝛽2,𝑡 coefficients between care 
homes (hollow circles) and domiciliary care agencies (black circles) and includes the full set 
of controls. The results provide compelling evidence of the causal effect of the minimum wage 
change on hourly wage growth: whilst no significant correlation between the low-paid 
proportion and quarter-on-quarter wage growth can be detected prior to the NLW introduction, 
a statistically significant correlation emerges from the first quarter following the minimum 
wage increase. 
 In order to ease the interpretation of the results, Table 11 reports the estimates of the 
cumulated sum ∑ 𝛽2𝑡𝑘𝑡=1  for 𝑘 = 4. This is equivalent to estimating the following specification: Δ𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼3 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑗,𝑀𝑎𝑟2016 + 𝑋𝑗,𝑀𝑎𝑟2016′ 𝛾3 + 𝜈𝑗,𝑡 (3) 
where Δ𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑗,𝑡 is the change in the natural logarithm of the average hourly wage in firm 𝑗 
between March 2016 and March 2017; all other variables are defined as above and 𝜈 is a 
disturbance term. The parameter 𝛽3 captures the relationship between the proportion of low-
paid workers and the average hourly wage growth in the 12 months after the NLW introduction. 




(2) and (4) allow 𝛽3 to vary across the two sectors. The regression models in columns (3) and 
(4) include the above-listed firm-level controls. In all cases there is significant evidence of 
larger wage increases in firms with more low-wage workers in the pre-NLW period, as 
measured by the March 2016 proportion of low-wage workers. According to the estimate in 
column (3), a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of low-paid workers 
(corresponding to a 34 percentage point change as reported in Table 10) implies a 1.9 
percentage-point faster wage growth on a baseline of 4 percent, indicating a strong and 
significant relationship between our measure of the NLW bite (𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑗,𝑀𝑎𝑟2016) and wage growth 
after the policy change. According to the estimates in columns (2) and (4), there is no 
differential relationship between the initial proportion of low-paid workers and wage growth 
in the domiciliary care and care home sector. 
We now consider whether the wage cost shock induced by the NLW introduction had 
consequences on ZHC utilisation by firms. Figure 11 probes the relationship between the low-
paid proportion in March 2016 and growth in ZHC utilisation by reporting the coefficients 𝛽1,𝑡 
for 𝑡 = −4, … , 0 and the cumulated sum ∑ 𝛽1𝑡𝑘𝑡=1  for 𝑘 = 1, … ,4, from estimating model (1) 
on the balanced panel of firms that are active throughout all months between March 2015 and 
March 2017. Similar to Figure 10, the dots indicate the estimated coefficients and the capped 
vertical bars report 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The 
specification allows for heterogeneity in the 𝛽1,𝑡 coefficients between care homes (hollow 
circles) and domiciliary care agencies (black circles) and includes the full set of controls. The 
graph shows no differential growth in ZHC utilisation prior to the introduction of the NLW 
across firms more or less exposed to the minimum wage increase. After the policy change, a 
positive relationship between our measure of the NLW bite and ZHC utilisation emerges in 
both sectors, with a larger effect size in the domiciliary care one. Starting from the second 




overall dynamic of the effect gives strength to a causal interpretation of the impact of the 
minimum wage hike on ZHC utilisation. 
Table 12 reports the regression coefficient 𝛽3 from estimating model (3) using the 
change in the share of ZHC workers between March 2016 and March 2017 (Δ𝑌𝑗,𝑡) as outcome 
variable. Estimates in columns (1) and (3) refer to the pooled sample of care homes and 
domiciliary care agencies, while those in columns (2) and (4) allow 𝛽3 to vary across the two 
sectors. The regression models in columns (3) and (4) include the firm-level controls. The 
coefficient estimate reported in column (3) indicates that a one standard deviation increase in 
the proportion of low-paid workers is associated with a statistically significant 0.5 percentage-
point faster growth in ZHC utilisation. When 𝛽3 is allowed to vary across care home and 
domiciliary care sectors (columns (2) and (4)), the effect increases by a factor of more than 
three in the domiciliary care sector. According to the results in column (4), a one standard 
deviation increase in the proportion of workers paid below the minimum is associated with a 
0.4 percentage point larger increase in ZHC utilisation from a baseline of 0.6 in the care home 
sector, and a 1.5 percentage point larger increase in ZHC utilisation from a baseline of 6 
percentage points in the domiciliary care sector. We take this evidence as suggestive of an 
increase in the share of contracts with no minimum guaranteed hours in response to the 
minimum wage increase, more so in a context – such as that of domiciliary care agencies – in 
which work tends to be organised into short and fragmented tasks.19 
An interesting question to ask is whether the increased share of ZHCs is due to the 
conversion of previously non-ZHC positions into ZHC ones, the creation of new ZHC jobs or 
the displacement of workers on non-ZHC positions. For the first option to be true, we would 
need to observe no employment effects of the NLW introduction, for the second positive 
                                                 
19 It is worth noting that, relative to the baseline, the effect size is larger for more exposed care homes, though this 




employment effects and for the third negative employment effects. We investigate this 
mechanism in Table A4 in Appendix A, where we report estimates of the coefficient 𝛽3 of 
model (3), using the change in the logarithm of employment headcount between March 2016 
and March 2017 as outcome variable. Our results do not point to significant employment effects 
twelve months after the NLW introduction, thus suggesting that new ZHC jobs replaced non-
ZHC positions.  
We also investigate whether the NLW introduction had an impact on the utilisation of 
other flexible contractual arrangements: temporary contracts, bank work and temporary agency 
contracts.20 Regression estimates of model (3) are reported in columns (1) to (4) of the various 
panels of Table A5 in Appendix A. For temporary contracts of all types, estimates are of limited 
magnitude and statistically insignificant. 
5.10 Estimating the Effect of Wages on ZHC Utilisation 
The analysis illustrated in the previous subsection provides reduced-form evidence of 
the causal effect on the NLW introduction on the increased utilisation of ZHCs. In this section, 
we are interested in estimating the effect of the wage cost shock induced by the NLW 
introduction on ZHC utilisation, i.e. a parameter that can potentially be generalised to other 
policy-relevant settings. 
The empirical strategy is based on the estimation of the following structural-form 
model:  Δ𝑌𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼4 + 𝛽4Δ𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑗,𝑀𝑎𝑟2016′ 𝛾4 + 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 (4) 
                                                 
20 We report here the formal definitions of these three contractual arrangements, as defined by NMDS-SC. 
Temporary contract: the worker is employed for a limited duration, normally either on a fixed term contract or 
for a fixed task, or on a spell of casual or seasonal employment as a “temp”. Bank worker: the worker is retained 
by the organisation as a whole, but deployed on a casual or short term basis. Temporary agency work: the worker 
is supplied by an outside employment agency/bureau; this category includes staff employed by NHS professionals, 




where Δ𝑌𝑗,𝑡 is the change in the share of workers employed with a zero hours contract between 
March 2016 and March 2017; Δ𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑗,𝑡 is the change in the natural logarithm of the average 
wage in firm 𝑗 between March 2016 and March 2017; 𝑋 is a vector of above-listed pre-NLW 
firm-level characteristics and local authority districts fixed effects; 𝜃 is a disturbance term. The 
parameter 𝛽4 measures the semi-elasticity of ZHC utilisation to the wage rate.  
Due to the potential endogeneity of Δ𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑗,𝑡, we estimate equation (4) via a two-stage 
least squares approach and instrument the change in the logarithm of the average wage Δ𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑗,𝑡 
with 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑗,𝑀𝑎𝑟2016. Model (3) can therefore be considered as the first stage of the instrumental 
variable model. The estimates reported in Table 11 prove the relevance of 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑗,𝑀𝑎𝑟2016 as 
instrument for Δ𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑗,𝑡. Moreover, the patterns illustrated in Figures 10 and 11 combined 
provide compelling evidence in favour of the exogeneity of the instrument and of the exclusion 
restriction. 
Estimates of the coefficient 𝛽4 are reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table 12, where 
column (5) is based on the pooled sample, while column (6) allows the coefficient 𝛽4 to vary 
between care homes and domiciliary care agencies. The estimate in column (5) points to a 
positive and significant wage semi-elasticity of 0.26, whereby a 4.1 percent increase in hourly 
wages (the average in the sample) leads to a 1.1 percentage point faster growth in ZHC 
utilisation on a baseline of 1.9 percentage points. Once we allow the parameter to vary across 
the two industries, the effect becomes significantly larger in the domiciliary care sector, and 
smaller for the care home sector. According to the estimates in column (6), a 4.1 percent 
increase in wages (the average in the sample) leads to a 3.3 percentage point faster growth on 
a baseline of 6.1 percentage points in the domiciliary care sector. In the care home sector, a 




baseline of 0.6 percentage points.21 Thus, it seems that one consequence of care sector 
employers paying higher wages to their staff is a raised likelihood of also placing them on a 
zero hours contract. This is especially true of domiciliary care employers. 
5.11 Using LFS to Further Probing the Results for Low Paid Workers 
Finally, we test whether a change in the proportion of ZHC utilisation for care workers, 
and workers in other low paying industries, following the introduction of the NLW is also 
visible in the national statistics data. Figure 12 presents the evolution of the proportion of care 
workers on ZHCs around the introduction of the NLW using data from the LFS, for the period 
from 2014 to 2017. As can be seen, in the quarter following the introduction there is an increase 
in the proportion of ZHCs. The first two columns of Table 13 present an empirical counterpart 
to the graph from the following estimating equation: 𝑍𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼5 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑁𝐿𝑊𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡′ 𝛾5 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 (5) 
where 𝑍𝐻𝐶 is a binary indicator of ZHC status for worker 𝑖 in period 𝑡; 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑁𝐿𝑊 is a dummy 
taking value one after March 2016; 𝑋 is a vector of individual-level controls including age, 
education, and dummies for gender, white ethnicity, British nationality, working in the public 
sector and regional location; 𝑢 is a disturbance term. 22 
 The results shown in the first two columns of Table 13 demonstrate that, following the 
NLW introduction, the proportion of workers employed on ZHCs in the social care sector 
increased. In the column (2) specification including controls, it rose by 1 percentage point, or 
a sizable 24 percent of the pre-NLW mean.23 Furthermore, this positive association appears 
generalisable to other lowing paying industries. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 13 present results 
                                                 
21 Estimates of model (4) using the share of other forms of flexible contractual arrangements as outcome variable 
are reported in the various panels of Table A5 in Appendix A. 
22 Twelve region dummies were included in total. 
23 A regression using only care workers (i.e. based on occupation rather than industry) yields a similar result, with 




for estimates of equation (5) using a sample of all workers employed in low paying industries.24 
As can be seen, the results are almost identical to those for the social care industry. Table A6 
in Appendix A breaks down the results into all 13 low paying industries and as can be seen all 
industries (aside from security) have a positive 𝛽5 coefficient (albeit with varying magnitudes 
and degrees of significance). Given the evidence outlined earlier in this section using the 
NMDS-SC data, we feel there is substantive evidence to suggest that the increase in ZHC 
utilisation in the social care industry and in low paying industries in general in the national 




 This paper offers new evidence on the rise and nature of alternative work arrangements, 
with a specific focus on ZHCs in the context of the UK labour market. Combining both 
secondary and newly collected survey data, we provide a comprehensive assessment of the 
nature of ZHCs, which had been so far only very limitedly studied. The survey data allow us 
to empirically document the characteristics of workers engaged in ZHCs and to better 
understand the trade-off between flexibility and insecure, low pay that is inherent in this type 
of work arrangement.  
Furthermore, we investigate whether minimum wage policies have a role in the 
increased utilisation of ZHCs by firms. We do so by leveraging a novel matched employer 
employee dataset of English adult social care providers and credible identifying variation 
stemming from the NLW introduction in the UK labour market. 
The analysis finds that many workers on ZHCs are relatively low paid, with a large 
proportion being paid at or slightly above the minimum wage. Such relatively low pay, coupled 
with limited and fragmented hours, implies high levels of earnings insecurity for workers 
                                                 
24 The low paying industries used are those in the UK’s Low Pay Commission list, which can be found in LPC 




whose only option is to work on this type of arrangement. Indeed, a stark dichotomy emerges 
between workers who value the flexibility provided by ZHC jobs, and workers who would 
rather work more and more regular hours and therefore appear to be engaged in ZHCs out of 
necessity rather than choice.  
The analysis reveals that minimum wage policies appear to have had some bearing on 
the increased utilisation of ZHCs. Specifically, in the context of the English adult social care 
sector, we find that the NLW introduction led to a larger incidence of ZHCs. The increase is 
more highly pronounced in the domiciliary care sector, a sector in which work has traditionally 
been organised around fragmented hours. This suggests that firms exploit the flexibility of 
ZHCs in order to buffer the wage cost shock induced by the minimum wage increase. It remains 
to be understood whether these effects will stabilise or grow larger in the longer run – an issue 
we intend to study in due course. Similarly, the issue of whether there should be a higher 
minimum wage for ZHC workers (as suggested in the Taylor, 2017, review of modern work 
practices) is a research question that needs economic evidence to better inform its viability as 
a future option for labour market policy. In particular, our evidence suggests that a domiciliary 
worker paid the NMW experienced both an increase of 7.5% in their wages and 6.1% in their 
probability of being on a ZHC as a result of the NLW introduction, and such a trade-off may 
have important welfare implications for workers, both in their current employment and for their 
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Figure 1 – Hourly Wage Distribution for all Workers and Workers on ZHC 
 
Note: The graphs show the distribution of hourly wages for all workers and workers who declare to be 
on a ZHC. The distribution is censored at £5 and £20.00. The data are binned into £0.20 bins. NLW 
denotes the level of the National Living Wage. 
Source: LFS.  
 
 
Figure 2 – Hourly Wage Distribution for Workers on ZHC 
 
Note: The graph shows the distribution of hourly wages for respondents who declare to be on a ZHC. 
The distribution is censored at £5.00 and £20.00. The data are binned into £0.20 bins. 




Figure 3 – Weekly Hours Distribution for Workers on ZHC 
 
Note: The graph shows the distribution of weekly hours of work for respondents who declare to be on 
a ZHC. The distribution is trimmed at the 95th percentile. 
Source: LSE-CEP survey. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Desired Hours of Workers on ZHC 
 
Note: The graph shows the distribution of responses to the question “Would you have preferred to work 
more or fewer hours last week in your zero hours contract or on-call job at that wage rate? Or were you 
satisfied with the number of hours you worked?”. 






































Figure 5 – Reason for not Working More Hours (Workers on ZHC) 
 
Note: The graph shows the distribution of responses to the question “Why were you NOT able to work 
more last week?”. 
Source: LSE-CEP survey. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Reason for Wanting Fewer Hours (Workers on ZHC) 
 
Note: The graph shows the distribution of responses to the question “Why would you want to work 
fewer hours?”. 

















































































































Figure 7 – Desired Pattern of Hours for Workers on ZHC 
 
Note: The graph shows the distribution of responses to the question “Would you have preferred to work 
a pattern of more regular hours last week on your zero hours contract or on-call job at that wage rate? 
Or were you satisfied with the pattern of hours you worked?”. 
Source: LSE-CEP survey. 
 
 
Figure 8 – Main Reason for Being on ZHC 
 
Note: The graph shows the distribution of responses to the question “Which is the most important reason 
why you work on a zero hours contract or on-call job?”. 








































































Figure 9 – Job Satisfaction of Workers on ZHC 
 
Note: The graph shows the distribution of responses to the question “How satisfied are you with 
working on a zero hours contract or on-call job?”. 















































Figure 10 – Effect of Initial Low-paid Proportion on Wage Growth by Sector 
 
Notes: For the quarters before the NLW introduction, the graph reports the estimated coefficients ?̂?2,𝑡 
from model (2) for care homes and domiciliary care agencies. After the NLW introduction, the graph 
reports the estimated sum ∑ ?̂?2,𝑡𝑘𝑡=1  for 𝑘 = 1, … ,4. The sample is a balanced panel of adult social care 
providers active between March 2015 and March 2017. The vertical bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals based on robust standard errors. Control variables included in the underlying regression are 
the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, 
average age (all workers), occupancy rate and local authority district dummies. When data on firm-
level covariates is missing, such missing information is controlled for via a set of dummy 
variables. 






Figure 11 – Effect of Initial Low-paid Proportion on Proportion of Employees on ZHC by 
Sector 
 
Notes: For the quarters before the NLW introduction, the graph reports the estimated coefficients ?̂?1,𝑡 
from model (1) for care homes and domiciliary care agencies. After the NLW introduction, the graph 
reports the estimated sum ∑ ?̂?1,𝑡𝑘𝑡=1  for 𝑘 = 1, … ,4. The sample is a balanced panel of adult social care 
providers active between March 2015 and March 2017. The vertical bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals based on robust standard errors. Control variables included in the underlying regression are 
the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, 
average age (all workers), occupancy rate and local authority district dummies. When data on firm-
level covariates is missing, such missing information is controlled for via a set of dummy 
variables. 






Figure 12 – Proportion of Care workers on ZHCs (LFS) 
 
 
Notes: The graph presents the evolution of the proportion of care workers on ZHCs from April 2014 to 
April 2017. The dashed line marks the introduction of the NLW at the start of 2nd quarter in 2016. 




Table 1 – Forms of Employment in the UK Institutional Setting  
 Permanent 
Employment 
Zero-Hour Contract Self-Employment 
National Insurance 
Contributions25 
Employers pay NI 
contributions on their 
employee’s earnings 
and benefits, above the 
threshold of £162 a 
week, at a rate of 
13.8%. 
Employees  pay NI on 
their earnings and 
benefits above the 
threshold of £162 a 
week at a rate of 12%. 
Above the earnings 
threshold of £892 a 
week this drops to 2%. 
Employers pay NI 
contributions on their 
employee’s earnings 
and benefits, above the 
threshold of £162 a 
week, at a rate of 
13.8%. 
Employees  pay NI on 
their earnings and 
benefits above the 
threshold of £162 a 
week at a rate of 12%. 
Above the earnings 
threshold of £892 a 
week this drops to 2%. 
Contributions are only 
made by the worker. 
Above the yearly 
profit threshold of 
£6,205 there is a flat 
rate of £2.95 per week. 
Between £8,424 and 
£46,350 there is a rate 
of 9% and above 






covered by Minimum 
Wage legislation. 
ZHC workers are 
covered by Minimum 
Wage legislation. 
Self-Employed 
workers are not 
covered by Minimum 
Wage legislation. 
Holiday Pay coverage Full-time employees 
are entitled to 28 days 
paid holiday leave per 
year, and part time 
employees the pro-rata 
equivalent. 
ZHC workers are 
entitled to the same 
degree of holiday pay 
as permanent 
employees. Due to the 
nature of ZHC work, 
many firms include 
holiday pay in the 
workers hourly wage 
rate. 
Self-Employed 
workers are not 
entitled to holiday pay. 
Sick Pay coverage Permanent employees 
are entitled to statutory 
sick pay, assuming 
they earn at least £116 
per week. 
ZHC workers are 
entitled to statutory 
sick pay, only if they 
earn at least £116 on 
average from one 
employer.26 
Self-Employed 
workers are not 
entitled sick pay. 
Unfair Dismissal 
Protection, Minimum 




dismissal, are covered 
As ZHC workers’ 
hours can be changed 
at the discretion of the 
employer, the 
Self-Employed 
workers are not 
covered by unfair 
dismissal protection, 
                                                 
25 NI contributions build up your state pension, whilst also helping to pay for the NHS and other welfare 
services. 
26 Reports from the UK’s Citizens Advice Bureau suggests some employers attempt to avoid paying out sick pay 






by statutory minimum 
notice periods, and 
entitled to statutory 
redundancy pay.   
employer is in their 
right to offer zero 
hours in perpetuity, 
effectively ending the 
employment 
relationship. Thus, 




period, nor a 
requirement to pay 
redundancy pay. 
Some instances of case 
law in the UK has 
tried to establish that 
ZHC workers who 
work regular hours 
may be eligible for 
aspects of dismissal 
protection. 
minimum notice 
periods or statutory 
redundancy pay. 
 





Table 2 – Examples of Zero Hour-Like Contracts in Europe and the United States 
 
Country Name Description and/or Regulation 
France NA ZHCs are outlawed in most cases. All part-time contracts must include 
the number and distribution of hours. Collective bargaining agreements 
require a minimum of 24 hours per week but can be reduced at the 
request of the employee. Exceptions for youth in education and 
temporary agency workers. 
Germany On-call 
work 
Generally, contracts must specify weekly and daily working hours. If 
agreed by the employer and employee (or employee representative) a 
contract could avoid specifying weekly working hours, in which case 10 
weekly working hours are deemed to be agreed. If the daily working 
hours are not specified, the employer is bound to call the employee for 
at least 3 consecutive hours per day.  
Italy On-call 
work 
Contracts exist but are heavily regulated. Contracts must be justified by 
reference to production cycles and organisation needs, and companies 
who use them must notify the ministry of labour. Banned from public 
administration, weekend work and bank holiday work. Only workers 
under 25 and over 55 can be placed on them. Limits to 400 working days 




These contracts give no fixed hours and the employer can vary the 
working hours. No known regulation. 
Norway Zero Hour 
Contracts 
Till recently such contracts made up around 0.8% of the workforce. Case 
law from 2005 and 2017 has deemed the use of permanent contracts 
where employees were to work only on-call as illegal and evading 
temporary employment law (which has strict usage and limitations). 




Unlike the UK, there is an obligation on behalf of the employee to work 
when called upon. Each time an employee is called to worker, they must 
be paid a minimum of 3 hours wages (even if there is less than 3 hours 
work for them). Following 3 months of continuous employment on a 
ZHC, the agreed number of hours adjusts to the average number of hours 
during the previous 3 months. 
Min.-max. 
contract 
Employees are given a guaranteed number of hours- weekly, monthly or 
annually. These are always paid even if the employer is unable to provide 
work. If the guaranteed number of hours per week is 15 hours or less, 
then similar regulation to the ZHCs is enforceable. During periods of 







Diffusion of on-call working arrangements have increased from 1.6% in 
1995 to 2.6% in 2015 (Katz and Krueger, 2016). There is no federal 
regulation, however eight states operate “show-up pay” laws, where 
employers are required to pay workers for a minimum number of hours 
(no matter how long they work), if they have been called to work. 
Coverage however varies across these eight states, and a number of 
exemptions exist. A few cities (e.g. San Francisco, Seattle, New York) 
operate fair scheduling ordinances, though the content of these may vary 
by city. As an example, the San Francisco ordinance requires new 
employees to receive a written estimate of their expected days and hours 
of shifts. Schedules must be posted at least two weeks in advance, 
changes with less than a weeks’ notice results in compensation 
entitlement for the employee, and employees required to be on call but 




employers have available hours, these must be offered to existing part-
time employees before hiring additional part-time workers. 
 





Table 3 – LFS Descriptive Statistics 
 
 All Employees Zero Hour Contract 
Employees 
 2017 2017 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
     
Age 43.43 13.39 38.22 16.67 
Prop. Female 0.49 0.50 0.59 0.49 
Prop. In FT Education 0.03 0.17 0.17 0.38 
Age When Completed FT (Conditional on 
Completed) 
18.63 3.10 18.32 3.05 
Median Tenure (Categorical) 5-10 Years 1-2 Years 
Prop. Part Time 0.29 0.45 0.67 0.47 
Prop. Under 25 0.09 0.29 0.31 0.46 
Hourly Wage 14.73 11.78 9.77 7.46 
Hourly Wage (25+) 15.42 12.13 10.76 7.96 
Hourly Wage (Under 25) 8.24 3.63 7.47 5.50 
Median Hourly Wage 11.50 7.90 
Hours Worked In Reference Week 31.40 17.38 21.33 16.98 
Like To Work More Hours 0.08 0.27 0.25 0.43 
     
Sample Size 71,604 1,907 
   
 
Note: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of a set of individual characteristics for the 
employees from the LFS, for both all employees and ZHC workers, in 2017. The ZHC indicator only 
appears in April-June and October-December quarters of the LFS. Thus the above statistics use only 
those two quarters for each year. Wage data only appears in two waves of the survey, thus wage stats 




Table 4 – The Bite of the National Living Wage 
 
 All Employees Zero Hour Contract 
Employees 
 2016 2017 2016 2017 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
         
Proportion paid less than next NLW  0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.54 0.50 0.49 0.50 
Proportion paid less than next NLW 
(25+) 
0.16 0.37 0.16 0.36 0.41 0.49 0.39 0.49 
Proportion paid exactly NLW 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40 
Proportion paid exactly NLW (25+) 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.42 
     
Sample Size 20,638 21,102 606 554 
     
 
Note: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of proportions of employees impacted by the 





Table 5 – Transitions Out of ZHC Work (Between Quarter T and T+5) 
 
 Status in period T+5  












Status in  
period T 
 
        
Inactive 




21.20 36.71 19.94 15.19 0.63 1.90 4.43 
100.00 
(316) 
Full Time - 
Employed 
2.47 1.13 88.91 4.41 1.79 0.49 0.81 
100.00 
(4,697) 
Part Time - 
Employed 
7.20 1.55 9.50 76.22 0.75 1.55 3.22 
100.00 
(1,737) 
Full Time - Self 
Employed 
2.58 0.49 8.11 0.86 79.85 6.88 1.23 
100.00 
(814) 
Part Time - Self 
Employed 




15.17 4.83 16.55 20.00 4.14 2.76 36.55 
100.00 
(145) 

















         
 
Note: For each type of economic activity today, the table reports the percentage of respondents working 
arrangements in 5 quarters time. The data is pooled from the LFS panel survey, from January 2015 to 
March 2018. For all those in some form of employment, their primary job is reported. Sample sizes 








Table 6 – Transitions Into ZHC Work (Between Quarter T and T+5) 
 
 Status in period T+5  














        
         
Inactive 




2.55 37.18 1.38 2.69 0.25 1.55 6.70 
2.96 
(316) 
Full Time - 
Employed 
4.41 16.99 91.52 11.59 10.51 5.93 18.18 
43.94 
(4,697) 
Part Time - 
Employed 
4.75 8.65 3.62 74.13 1.63 6.96 26.79 
16.25 
(1,737) 
Full Time - 
Self Empl 
0.80 1.28 1.45 0.39 81.35 14.43 4.78 
7.62 
(814) 
Part Time - 
Self Empl 




0.84 2.24 0.53 1.62 0.75 1.03 25.36 
1.36 
(145) 

















         
 
Note: For each type of economic activity today, the table reports the percentage of respondents working 
arrangements 5 quarters before. The data is pooled from the LFS panel survey, from January 2015 to 
March 2018. For all those in some form of employment, their primary job is reported. Sample sizes 






Table 7 – Sample of ZHC Workers in LSE-CEP Survey 
 




   
Female 0.53 0.50 
Age 36.28 13.21 
Age 18-24 0.26 0.44 
Age 25-34 0.25 0.43 
Age 35-44 0.19 0.39 
Age 45-54 0.18 0.38 
Age 55-65 0.13 0.33 
No qualifications 0.02 0.13 
Some GCSE/O levels 0.10 0.30 
5 or more GCSE/O levels 0.13 0.34 
Trade/technical/vocational training 0.11 0.31 
A levels 0.23 0.42 
Bachelor’s degree 0.27 0.45 
Master’s degree 0.11 0.31 
Doctorate degree 0.03 0.16 
North East 0.05 0.22 
North West 0.12 0.32 
Yorkshire and Humberside 0.06 0.23 
East Midlands 0.08 0.27 
West Midlands 0.09 0.29 
Eastern England 0.08 0.26 
London 0.19 0.40 
South East 0.12 0.33 
South West 0.08 0.27 
Wales 0.04 0.20 
Scotland 0.07 0.26 
Northern Ireland 0.02 0.15 
Married/Cohabiting 0.44 0.50 
Widow/Separated/Divorced 0.10 0.30 
Never married 0.45 0.50 
Children 0.55 0.50 
White 0.84 0.37 
Mixed/Multiple ethnic group 0.04 0.20 
Asian/Asian British 0.06 0.23 
Black/African/Caribbean/Black British 0.06 0.23 
Arab 0.00 0.06 
   
Sample Size 1,167  








Table 7 – Sample of ZHC Workers in LSE-CEP Survey (Cont.) 
 




   
Multiple employers (ZHC jobs) 0.42 0.49 
Non-ZHC job holder 0.34 0.47 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.01 0.08 
Mining and quarrying 0.01 0.08 
Manufacturing 0.07 0.25 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 0.02 0.15 
Water supply, sewerage, waste management 0.01 0.10 
Construction 0.06 0.24 
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles 0.09 0.29 
Transportation and storage 0.06 0.24 
Accommodation and food service activities 0.11 0.32 
Information and communication 0.05 0.22 
Financial and insurance activities 0.03 0.18 
Real estate activities  0.01 0.07 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 0.03 0.16 
Administrative and support service activities 0.05 0.23 
Public administration and defence 0.01 0.10 
Education  0.09 0.29 
Human health and social work activities 0.15 0.36 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 0.06 0.24 
Other service activities  0.06 0.23 
Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel 0.01 0.12 
Activities of extraterritorial organizations 0.00 0.07 
Other 0.01 0.07 
Hourly wage 11.63 8.16 
Hourly Wage (median) 8.64 
Hours worked in previous week 18.62 13.67 
Different days worked per week 4.06 1.71 
Proportion doing unpaid hours 0.32 0.47 
Average weekly unpaid hours 7.08 9.02 
Less than one year of working experience 0.05 0.23 
1-3 years of working experience 0.17 0.38 
3-5 years of working experience 0.15 0.36 
More than 5 years of experience 0.62 0.48 
Less than one year of working experience in ZHC 0.52 0.50 
1-3 years of working experience in ZHC 0.21 0.41 
3-5 years of working experience in ZHC 0.14 0.35 
More than 5 years of experience in ZHC 0.13 0.34 
Received work-related training in the last year 0.55 0.50 
   
Sample Size 1,167  
   
 
Note: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of a set of individual characteristics for the 
sample of respondents who declared to be on a ZHC in the week prior to taking the survey. 






Table 8 – Training of Workers on ZHC 
 
   
 Received in last 
year 






   
Technical or technology training 0.18 0.23 
Quality training 0.30 0.24 
Skills training 0.54 0.50 
Continuing education 0.13 0.20 
Professional training and legal training 0.22 0.24 
Managerial training 0.15 0.23 
Safety training 0.56 0.27 
Other 0.01 0.02 
   
Sample Size 644 1,167 
   
 
Note: The table reports answers to the question “What type of training [did you receive last year]?” in 
column (1) and to the question “What type of training would you find most useful to improve your job 
prospects?” in column (2). The table reports the proportion of respondents who ticked each of the preset 
options. 
Source: LSE-CEP survey. 
 
 
Table 9 – Who Pays for the Training of Workers on ZHC 
 





Me or a family member 0.16 
A contractor or customer 0.11 
My employer 0.59 
Someone else 0.02 
No one, it was free 0.12 
  
Sample Size 644 
  
 
Note: The table reports answers to the question “Who paid for the cost of the training?”. The table 
reports the proportion of respondents who ticked each of the preset options. 







Table 10 – NMDS-SC Summary Statistics 
 
 All firms Care homes 
Domiciliary care 
agencies 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
       
Firm level variables       
       
Number of employees 45.22 46.26 38.99 31.16 65.97 74.00 
Proportion under 25 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09 
Hourly wage 7.57 1.09 7.53 1.11 7.67 1.01 
Weekly hours  25.61 8.90 28.56 5.17 15.75 11.31 
Weekly earnings 189.42 79.01 212.80 54.35 111.59 96.54 
Hourly wage carer 7.10 0.93 7.01 0.97 7.43 0.68 
Weekly hours carer 24.49 10.30 27.98 6.25 12.41 12.25 
Proportion on ZHC 0.12 0.23 0.05 0.10 0.38 0.33 
Proportion on permanent contract 0.88 0.17 0.90 0.11 0.82 0.27 
Proportion on temporary contract 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.15 
Proportion on bank contract 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.13 
Proportion on agency contract 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.16 
Female 0.85 0.13 0.84 0.13 0.87 0.11 
Age 42.60 4.63 42.71 4.53 42.21 4.92 
Proportion carer 0.61 0.19 0.56 0.16 0.75 0.23 
Proportion with nursing qualification 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.01 
Occupancy rate 0.77 0.33 0.92 0.14 0.27 0.30 
       
Proportion paid below NLW 0.48 0.34 0.52 0.32 0.34 0.36 
       
Number of firms 4,680  3,599  1,081  
       
 
Note: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of a set of firm-level variables for the balanced 
sample of firms used in the analysis. The statistics refer to March 2016, and are shown for the full 








Table 11 – Wage Equations 
Dep. Var.: Change in log average hourly wage 
March 2016 to March 2017 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Initial low-paid proportion 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Initial low-paid proportion x Domiciliary  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
     
Observations 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
F-stat 519.52 280.43 410.41 203.22 
Mean of dep. var.:     
All firms 0.041    
Care homes 0.043    
Domiciliary care 0.036    
     
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficient ?̂?3 from model (3). The sample is a balanced panel of 
adult social care providers active between March 2015 and March 2017. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial 
proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all 
workers), occupancy rate and local authority district dummies. When data on firm-level covariates is 
missing, such missing information is controlled for via a set of dummy variables. 





Table 12 – Zero Hour Contracts Equations 
Dep. Var.: Change in proportion of employees on zero hour contracts 
March 2016 to March 2017 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Initial low-paid proportion 0.001 0.006* 0.014** 0.012**   
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)   
Initial low-paid proportion x 
Domiciliary 
 0.039**  0.033*   
  (0.019)  (0.019)   
Change in log average wage     0.257** 0.219** 
     (0.126) (0.101) 
Change in log average wage x 
Domiciliary 
     0.596* 
      (0.350) 
       
Observations 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean of dep. var.:       
All firms 0.019      
Care homes 0.006      
Domiciliary care 0.061      
       
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient ?̂?3 from model (3) in columns (1)-(4), 
and the estimated IV coefficient ?̂?4 from model (4) in columns (5)-(6), using the change in the share of 
workers on ZHC as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of adult social care providers 
active between March 2015 and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-
value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female, proportion 
with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and 
local authority district dummies. When data on firm-level covariates is missing, such missing 






Table 13 – Zero Hour Contracts Equation (LFS Sample) 
     
 Social Care Industry 
 
Pooled Low Wage Industries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Post NLW 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Observations 25,191 25,191 91,362 91,362 
Pre-NLW mean of dep. var.   0.042 0.042 0.041 0.041 
     
 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficient ?̂?5 from the estimating equation (5). The sample for 
the first two columns is workers employed in the Social Care Industry, and for the second paid of 
columns is workers employed in Low Paying Industries (defined in LPC (2017)). The samples contain 
4 pre-NLW quarters (2014-2015 quarter 2 and quarter 4) and 3 post-NLW quarters (2016 quarter 2 and 
quarter 4, and 2017 quarter 2). Controls include age, education, gender, a dummy for white ethnicity, a 










Figure A1 – Minimum Wage Rates in the UK between 1999 and 2018 
 
Notes: The graph reports the various minimum wage rates in the UK between 1999 and 2018. The 
apprentice rate applies to apprentices. The 16-17 year-old rate to workers aged 16 and 17. The youth 
development rate to workers aged 18-20. The adult rate applied to workers aged 21 and over until March 
2016. From April 2016, the adult rate applies to workers aged 21-24 and the NLW to those aged 25 and 
over. 












   
Female 0.53 0.50 
Age 40.93 13.04 
Age 18-24 0.14 0.35 
Age 25-34 0.21 0.41 
Age 35-44 0.22 0.41 
Age 45-54 0.25 0.43 
Age 55-65 0.19 0.39 
No qualifications 0.04 0.19 
Some GCSE/O levels 0.12 0.32 
5 or more GCSE/O levels 0.13 0.34 
Trade/technical/vocational training 0.12 0.33 
A levels 0.22 0.41 
Bachelor’s degree 0.26 0.44 
Master’s degree 0.09 0.28 
Doctorate degree 0.02 0.12 
North East 0.05 0.22 
North West 0.11 0.32 
Yorkshire and Humberside 0.09 0.29 
East Midlands 0.08 0.27 
West Midlands 0.09 0.29 
Eastern England 0.07 0.26 
London 0.12 0.33 
South East 0.15 0.35 
South West 0.08 0.27 
Wales 0.05 0.22 
Scotland 0.08 0.27 
Northern Ireland 0.02 0.14 
Employed by government 0.17 0.38 
Employed by private company 0.49 0.50 
Employed by non-profit organization 0.07 0.26 
Self-employed, with or without employees 0.11 0.32 
Working in the family business 0.01 0.11 
Only work last week was filling out surveys 0.03 0.17 
Did not have a job last week 0.12 0.32 
   
Sample Size 18,831  
   
 
Note: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of a set of individual characteristics for the full 
sample of respondents to the LSE-CEP Survey of Self-Employment and Alternative Work 
Arrangements. 




Table A2 – CEP-LSE Survey Representativeness Based on LFS 2017 
 
   
 All 18-65 ZHC 18-65 
Variables 
 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
     
Female 0.52 0.50 0.60 0.49 
Age 42.78 13.34 37.85 14.91 
Age 18-24 0.11 0.32 0.28 0.45 
Age 25-34 0.19 0.40 0.19 0.39 
Age 35-44 0.22 0.41 0.16 0.37 
Age 45-54 0.24 0.43 0.18 0.38 
Age 55-65 0.24 0.43 0.19 0.39 
No Qualifications 0.08 0.26 0.06 0.24 
GCSE/O levels 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41 
Trade/Technical/Other 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.30 
A Levels 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45 
Bachelor’s Degree 0.30 0.46 0.23 0.42 
Master’s Degree 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.17 
Doctorate Degree 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.06 
North East 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22 
North West 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 
Yorkshire & The Humber 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.28 
East Midlands 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 
West Midlands 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.26 
East of England 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 
London 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.32 
South East 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.35 
South West 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.32 
Wales 0.04 0.21 0.01 0.11 
Scotland 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 
Northern Ireland 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.23 
Employed by Public Sector 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.36 
Employed by Private Sector 0.58 0.49 0.84 0.37 
Self-employed, with or without employees 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 
Does not have a job 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 
Hourly Wage 14.82 11.42 9.70 7.12 
Hourly Wage (median) 11.55 8.0 
     
Sample Size 108,983  1,686  
     
 
Note: The table reports summary statistics of individual level characteristics for all working age 
respondents and ZHC workers. Wage data only appears in two waves of the LFS, thus wage statistics 












 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) 
     
Prop. female  0.85 0.36 0.85 0.13 
Age 42.62 13.58 42.60 4.63 
Hourly rate 7.91 1.50 7.10 0.93 
Weekly hours 28.38 16.14 24.49 10.30 
Proportion on ZHC 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.23 
North East 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.23 
North West 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.12 0.32 0.10 0.31 
East Midlands 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.28 
West Midlands 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 
East England 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.34 
London 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.24 
South East 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 
South West 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.36 
     
Sample Size 
 
2,025  4,680  
 
Note: The table reports the mean and standard deviation for a set of individual-level characteristics for 
care workers in the LFS (columns (1) and (2)). The table also reports the mean and standard deviation 
for the same set of characteristics at the firm level in NMDS-SC (columns (3) and (4)). The LFS data 
refer to 2015Q4 and 2016Q1, and the NMDS-SC data to March 2016. The ZHC indicator only appears 
in April-June and October-December quarters of the LFS. Thus the proportion of ZHC reported in 
column (1) is based on 2015Q4 data only. Wage data only appears in two waves of the LFS, thus wage 
statistics in columns (1) and (2) are based off approximately one fifth of the number of observations. 






Table A4 – Employment Equations 
Dep. Var.: Change in log number of employees 
March 2016 to March 2017 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Initial low-paid proportion -0.000 -0.010 -0.001 -0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) 
Initial low-paid proportion x Domiciliary  0.036  0.024 
  (0.032)  (0.033) 
     
Observations 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
Mean of dep. var.:     
All firms 0.013    
Care homes 0.013    
Domiciliary care 0.012    
     
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient ?̂?3 from model (3), using the change in 
log headcount employment as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of adult social care 
providers active between March 2015 and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion 
female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), 
occupancy rate and local authority district dummies. When data on firm-level covariates is missing, 







Table A5 – Employment Contract Equations 
Dep. Var.: Change in proportion of employees by contract type between March 2016 and March 2017 
Panel A – Temporary contract 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Initial low-paid proportion -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.000   
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)   
Initial low-paid proportion x 
Domiciliary 
 -0.003  -0.001   
  (0.010)  (0.010)   
Change in log average wage     -0.038 -0.008 
     (0.060) (0.046) 
Change in log average wage x 
Domiciliary 
     -0.129 
      (0.167) 
       
Observations 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean of dep. var.:       
All firms -0.002      
Care homes -0.001      
Domiciliary care -0.005      
       
 
Panel B – Bank 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Initial low-paid proportion 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001   
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)   
Initial low-paid proportion x 
Domiciliary 
 0.008  0.011   
  (0.006)  (0.007)   
Change in log average wage     0.037 -0.024 
     (0.056) (0.063) 
Change in log average wage x 
Domiciliary 
     0.193 
      (0.118) 
       
Observations 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean of dep. var.:       
All firms -0.004      
Care homes -0.004      
Domiciliary care -0.005      






Panel C – Agency contract 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Initial low-paid proportion 0.001 -0.001* 0.001 0.000   
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)   
Initial low-paid proportion x 
Domiciliary 
 0.000  0.001   
  (0.007)  (0.008)   
Change in log average wage     0.017 0.001 
     (0.040) (0.027) 
Change in log average wage x 
Domiciliary 
     0.023 
      (0.137) 
       
Observations 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean of dep. var.:       
All firms -0.002      
Care homes -0.000      
Domiciliary care -0.009      
       
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient ?̂?3 from model (3) in columns (1)-(4), 
and the estimated IV coefficient ?̂?4 from model (4) in columns (5)-(6), using the change in the share of 
workers on a given contract as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of adult social care 
providers active between March 2015 and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion 
female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), 
occupancy rate and local authority district dummies. When data on firm-level covariates is missing, 
such missing information is controlled for via a set of dummy variables. Temporary contract: the 
worker is employed for a limited duration, normally either on a fixed term contract or for a fixed task, 
or on a spell of casual or seasonal employment as a “temp”. Bank worker: the worker is retained by the 
organisation as a whole, but deployed on a casual or short term basis. Temporary agency work: the 
worker is supplied by an outside employment agency/bureau; this category includes staff employed by 







Table A6 –Zero Hour Contracts Equation, all Low Pay Industries (LFS Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




         
Post NLW 0.001 0.002 0.0118** 0.014** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.013 0.013 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.013) 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 27,058 27,058 12,446 12,446 25,191 25,191 1,701 1,701 




0.017 0.017 0.102 0.102 0.042 0.042 0.072 0.072 
         
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 


















         
Post NLW 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.024** 0.025** 0.011* 0.013** 0.003 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 5,729 5,729 3,541 3,541 2,885 2,885 1,915 1,915 
         
Pre-NLW 
mean of dep. 
var. 
0.019 0.019 0.099 0.099 0.025 0.025 0.010 0.010 
         
 (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
 Child Care Child Care Agriculture Agriculture Security Security Textiles Textiles 
         
Post NLW 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.001 -0.024 -0.019 0.018** 0.019** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.019) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 3,246 3,246 3,084 3,084 1,057 1,057 996 996 
         
Pre-NLW 
mean of dep. 
var. 
0.031 0.031 0.010 0.010 0.115 0.115 0.009 0.009 
         
 (25) (26) (27) (28)     
 Hairdressing Hairdressing Pooled Pooled     
         
Post NLW 0.010* 0.010** 0.008*** 0.010***     
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)     
Controls No Yes No Yes     
Observations 2,513 2,513 91,362 91,362     
         
Pre-NLW 
mean of dep. 
var. 
0.013 0.013 0.041 0.041     
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficient ?̂?5 from the estimating equation (5) using different 
Low Paying Industry samples, as defined in LPC (2017). The samples contain 4 pre-NLW quarters 
(2014-2015 quarter 2 and quarter 4) and 3 post-NLW quarters (2016 quarter 2 and quarter 4, and 2017 
quarter 2). Controls include age, education, gender, a dummy for white ethnicity, a dummy for British 
nationality, a dummy for working in the public sector and twelve regional dummies  







LSE-CEP Survey of Self-employment and Alternative Work Arrangements 
 
R1  
What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? 
 No qualifications 
 Some GCSE/O levels. 
 5 or more GCSE/O levels 
 Trade/technical/vocational training 
 A levels 
 Bachelor’s degree 
 Master’s degree 















Which region do you usually live in? 
 North East 
 North West 
 Yorkshire and Humberside 
 East Midlands 
 West Midlands  
 Eastern England 
 London 
 South East 
 South West 
 Wales 
 Scotland  







S1. On your main job last week, were you employed by government, by a private company, a nonprofit 
organization, or were you self-employed or working in the family business? Or were you not working 
at all last week? 
 Employed by government  GO TO S2 
 Employed by private for-profit company  GO TO S2 
 Employed by nonprofit organization including tax exempt and charitable organizations  GO TO 
S2 
 Self-employed, with or without employees  GO TO S3 
 Working in the family business  GO TO S3 
 Only work last week was filling out surveys  SCREENS OUT 
 Did not have a job last week  SCREENS OUT 
 
 
S2. Many people work in self-employment, on either a part-time or full-time basis, doing things such 
as working on construction jobs, selling goods or services in their businesses, or working through a 
digital platform or intermediary, such as Uber, Upwork, Deliveroo or Avon. Last week, were you 
working or self-employed as an independent contractor, an independent consultant, or freelance 
worker? That is, someone who obtains customers on their own to provide a product or service. 
 Yes  
 No  
 
 
S3. Last week, were you on a zero hours contract? Zero hours contracts are also known as casual 
contracts or ‘on call’ work. Under such contracts, people agree to be available for work as and when 
required, but have no guaranteed hours or times of work. 
 Yes  GO TO QUESTION Q1 
 No  GO TO QUESTION D1 
 
 
Q1 In your employment as a zero hours contract or on-call worker last week, did you have more than 
one employer or contract? Please consider only jobs on zero hours contracts or on-call jobs when 





Q2 Last week, did you do any paid work as self-employed or on employment contracts other than zero 
hours contracts or on-call jobs? 
 Yes 
 No  
 
 
Q3 In your zero hours contract or on-call job, how many hours did you work last week? Please, consider 
only hours you are paid for. 
Please enter: _______________ hours last week 
 
 
Q4 In your zero hours contract or on-call job, how many hours on average in a week? Please, consider 
only hours you are paid for. 






Q5 On how many (different) days per week do you usually work? 
Please enter: _______________ days per week 
 
 
Q6 How much did you earn per hour in your zero hours contract or on-call job last week? Please, 
consider only hours you are paid for. 
Please enter earnings: £___________ per hour 
 
 
Q7 Did you do any hours of unpaid work in your zero hours contract or on-call job last week? E.g. 
travel time from one customer to another. 
 Yes 
 No  
 
IF Q7 = YES 
Q7a How many hours of unpaid work did you do in your zero hours contract or on-call job last week? 
Please enter: _______________ hours of unpaid work last week 
 
 
Q8 Would you have preferred to work more or fewer hours last week in your zero hours contract or on-
call job at that wage rate? Or were you satisfied with the number of hours you worked?  
 More hours last week 
 Fewer hours last week 
 Satisfied with number of hours 
 
IF Q8 = More hours last week 
Q8a Why were you NOT able to work more last week? 
 I am not qualified for the available work 
 There isn’t enough available work 
 I have domestic commitments that prevent me from working more 
 I am ill or disabled  
 Other 
 
IF Q8 = Fewer hours last week 
Q8b Why would you want to work fewer hours? 
 I am a student 
 I am ill or disabled and do not feel I can take on more hours 
 I have domestic commitments that prevent me from working more 
 I want to spend more time on leisure or other unpaid activities 
 I want to do other types of work 
 Other 
 
Q9 Would you have preferred to work a pattern of more regular hours last week on your zero hours 
contract or on-call job at that wage rate? Or were you satisfied with the pattern of hours you worked?  
 More regular hours last week 
 Less regular hours last week 






Q10 How satisfied are you with working on a zero hours contract or on-call job? 
 Very satisfied  
 Satisfied 
 Neither satisfied not dissatisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
 Very dissatisfied 
 
 
Q11 Which of the following are reasons why you work on a zero hours contract or on-call job? Tick all 
that apply 
 Could not find employment in a job with a guaranteed number of hours 
 Pay is better than other available jobs 
 To complement pay from other jobs 
 To earn money while going to school 




Q11a Which is the most important reason why you work on a zero hours contract or on-call job? 
 Could not find employment in a job with a guaranteed number of hours 
 Pay is better than other available jobs 
 To complement pay from other jobs 
 To earn money while going to school 




IF Q11a = Could not find employment in a job with a guaranteed number of hours 
Q11b Please indicate which of the following reasons contributed to you not finding employment in a 
job with a guaranteed number of hours: 
 Lack of jobs near where I live 
 I faced discrimination 
 I am overqualified for the available jobs 




Q12 For how long have you been working on a zero hours contract or on-call job? 
 Less than one month 
 1 – 6 months 
 7 – 12 months  
 1 – 2 years 
 3 – 4 years 







Q13 How much longer do you expect to remain in your zero hours contract or on-call job? 
 Less than one month  
 1 – 6 months 
 7 – 12 months  
 One year or more 
 
 
Q14 Have you received any work-related training in the last year?  
 Yes SKIP TO Q14a 
 No SKIP TO Q14c 
 
 
Q14a What type of training? (Mark all that apply) 
[LIST IN RANDOM ORDER, BUT OTHER IS LAST] 
 Technical or technology training 
 Quality training 
 Skills training 
 Continuing education 
 Professional training and legal training 
 Managerial training 
 Safety training 
 Other (please specify: ________________________________ 
 
 
Q14b Who paid for the cost of the training? 
 Me or a family member  
 A contractor or customer 
 My employer 
 Someone else 
 No one, it was free 
 
 
Q14c What type of training would you find most useful to improve your job prospects? (Mark all that 
apply) 
[LIST IN RANDOM ORDER, BUT OTHER IS LAST] 
 Technical or technology training 
 Quality training 
 Skills training 
 Continuing education 
 Professional training and legal training 
 Managerial training 
 Safety training 
 Other (please specify: ________________________________ 
 
 
Q15 In your job on a zero hours contract or on-call job, what kind of work do you do, that is, what is 
your occupation? (For example: plumber, typist, farmer) 






Q15a What are your usual activities or duties at this job? (For example: typing, keeping account books, 
filing, selling cars, operating printing press, laying brick) 
Please enter your usual activities or duties: _______________________________ 
 
 
Q15b What kind of business or industry are you in at this job?  
 (A) Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
 (B) Mining and Quarrying 
 (C) Manufacturing 
 (D) Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply 
 (E) Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management and Remediation Activities 
 (F) Construction 
 (G) Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
 (H) Transportation and Storage 
 (I) Accommodation and Food Service Activities 
 (J) Information and Communication 
 (K) Financial and Insurance Activities 
 (L) Real Estate Activities 
 (M) Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities 
 (N) Administrative and Support Service Activities 
 (O) Public Administration and Defence, Compulsory Social Security 
 (P) Education 
 (Q) Human Health and Social Work Activities 
 (R) Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 
 (S) Other Service Activities 
 (T) Activities of Households as Employers of Domestic Personnel, Undifferentiated Goods and 
Services Producing Activities of Households for Own Use 
 (U) Activities of Extraterritorial Organisations and Bodies 
 Other (please specify ______________________________________) 
 
 
Q15c In your zero hours contract or on-call job, what is the main company you work for?  
Please specify name: ______________________________________ 
 
 
D1 Which country were you born in? 
Please specify: ___________________________ 
 
 
D2 What is your nationality? 







D3 Which category or categories below best describe your ethnic group? (Mark all that apply) 
 White 
 Mixed / Multiple ethnic group 
 Asian / Asian British 
 Black / African / Caribbean / Black British 
 Chinese 
 Arab 
 Other  (please specify: _________________________) 
 
 
D4 How many years of working experience have you got? 
 Less than one year  
 1 – 3 years 
 3 – 5 years 
 5 years or more 
 
 
D5 Are you now married, widowed, divorced, separated or never married? 
 Married 
 Widowed 
 Divorced  
 Separated  
 Never Married 
 Other (please specify: __________________________) 
 
 




 3 or more 
 
 
D7 Which category represents your total individual income (before taxes) during the past 12 months? 
This should include money from all jobs, net income from a business or farm, and any rent, pensions, 
dividends, interest, social security payments or other money income you received. 
 Less than £5,000 
 £5,000 to 9,999 
 £10,000 to 19,999 
 £20,000 to 39,999 
 £40,000 to 69,999 







D8 Which category represents total income (before taxes) of your household during the past 12 months? 
This should include money from all jobs, net income from a business or farm, and any rent, pensions, 
dividends, interest, social security payments or other money income that all members of your household 
received, including you. 
 Less than £5,000 
 £5,000 to 9,999 
 £10,000 to 19,999 
 £20,000 to 39,999 
 £40,000 to 69,999 
 £70,000 or more 
 
 





D10 Could you tell us how interesting or uninteresting you found the questions in this survey? 
 Very interesting 
 Interesting 
 Neither interesting nor uninteresting 
 Uninteresting 
 Very uninteresting 
 
 
 
 
